On the explanatory depth and pragmatic value of coarse-grained, probabilistic, causal explanations by Kinney, David
On the explanatory depth and pragmatic value of coarse-grained, 
probabilistic, causal explanations
LSE Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/100190/
Version: Published Version
Article:
Kinney, David (2019) On the explanatory depth and pragmatic value of coarse-
grained, probabilistic, causal explanations. Philosophy of Science, 86 (1). pp. 
145-167. ISSN 0031-8248 
https://doi.org/10.1086/701072
lseresearchonline@lse.ac.uk
https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ 
Reuse
Items deposited in LSE Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights 
reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private 
study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights 
holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is 
indicated by the licence information on the LSE Research Online record for the item.
On the Explanatory Depth and Pragmatic
Value of Coarse-Grained, Probabilistic,
Causal Explanations
David Kinney*y
This article considers the thesis that a more proportional relationship between a cause
and its effect yields a more abstract causal explanation of that effect, thereby producing
a deeper explanation. This thesis has important implications for choosing the optimal
granularity of explanation for a given explanandum. In this article, I argue that this thesis
is not generally true of probabilistic causal relationships. In light of this finding, I pro-
pose a pragmatic measure of explanatory depth. This measure uses a decision-theoretic
model of information pricing to determine the optimal granularity of explanation for a
given explanandum, agent, and decision problem.
1. Introduction. The special sciences frequently make probabilistic gen-
eralizations. To take a classic example, a patient who habitually smokes cig-
arettes is said to have a certain probability of developing lung cancer. These
generalizations often facilitate causal explanations. In the case of smoking
and lung cancer, if we ask why a given smoker develops lung cancer, we
can explain his or her affliction by saying that smoking was the likely cause.
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Similarly, if we observe a population in which more smokers develop lung
cancer than nonsmokers, then we can say that the higher incidence of lung
cancer among smokers is causally explained by the higher prevalence of
smoking.
In each of these cases, we could also tell a more complicated story. In-
stead of explaining patients’ lung cancer by citing the fact that they smoked,
we could attempt to cite a long series of facts about individual strands of
burnt tobacco producing carcinogenic particles that entered the smokers’
lungs at different spatio-temporal points, eventually causing them to develop
lung cancer. Clearly, there are pragmatic reasons for avoiding this kind of
reduction. The level of detail required for the second kind of explanation
would be incredibly cumbersome and clearly not suited for the task at hand.
In addition, many recent authors in philosophy of science, including Stre-
vens (2008), Weslake (2010, 2013), Woodward (2010, 2016), Weatherson
(2012), Franklin-Hall (2016), and Clarke (2017), have argued that coarse-
grained explanations are to be preferred on explanatory as well as pragmatic
grounds.1 The central idea that each of these authors expresses is that there
is a sense in which some coarse-grained causal generalizations provide deeper
explanations than their more fine-grained counterparts. Weslake defines ex-
planatory depth as “a measure in terms of which explanations can be as-
sessed according to their explanatory value” (2010, 273). Going forward, I
will adopt this definition: explanatory depth refers to the relative value of
an explanation qua explanation.
Most of these authors consider, and accept to varying degrees, the thesis
that higher-level causal explanations are deeper than lower-level explana-
tions when and because the causes cited are proportional to their effects.
The meaning of proportionality in this context will be made precise below,
but the basic idea is as follows. When a cause and an effect are both repre-
sented by a variable taking some value, the cause is proportional to the ef-
fect to the extent that it is true that if the causal variable had taken a different
value, then the effect variable would also have taken a different value. No-
tably, Weslake (2010, 2013) draws a link between the relative proportion-
ality and the relative abstractness of an explanation, where abstractness is
the ability of an explanatory causal model to be deployed in a wide range
of scenarios. Abstractness, he argues, provides a crucial link between pro-
portionality and explanatory depth; proportional explanations are deeper than
less proportional ones because they are more abstract.
However, the linkage between proportionality, abstractness, and explan-
atory depth has largely been developed in deterministic contexts. In what
follows, I argue that in probabilistic contexts, it can be the case that a more
1. Historically, similar positions have been held by Putnam (1979), Garfinkel (1981),
Kitcher (1981), Jackson and Pettit (1992), Sklar (1993), and Batterman (2001).
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proportional explanation is less abstract than a less proportional explanation
of the same explanandum. In some of these cases, the more proportional ex-
planation seems to be deeper, and in others, the more abstract explanation
seems to be deeper. Thus, probabilistic cases of causal explanation muddy
the waters when it comes to the relationship between proportionality, ab-
stractness, and depth. In these cases, I claim that we need to consider the
pragmatic value of an explanatory model in order to make sense of its rel-
ative explanatory depth. Thus, I reject the strict bifurcation between prag-
matics and explanatory depth and conclude that pragmatics may play an
indispensable role in assessing the relative depth of competing causal expla-
nations.
The plan for this essay is as follows. In section 2, I provide some back-
ground on probabilistic causal explanation and the formal notion of the
granularity of explanation. In section 3, I explicate the nature of the rela-
tionship between proportionality, abstractness, and explanatory depth, as
it is developed in deterministic contexts. In section 4, I turn to probabilistic
contexts. I introduce a probabilistic account of proportionality put forward
by Pocheville, Griffiths, and Stotz (2017) and use it to show how propor-
tionality and explanatory depth can come apart in cases in which subtle dif-
ferences in the nature of a cause lead to slight differences in the probability
of its effect. I then show how abstractness and explanatory depth can also
come apart in probabilistic cases. In section 5, I introduce my proposed mea-
sure of the pragmatic value of a causal model, using the decision-theoretic
concept of information pricing. I use this measure to argue that the pragmatic
value of a causal explanation allows us to determine the optimal level of
granularity for that explanation in a way that proportionality and abstractness
are unable to do. In section 6, I address some possible objections to my ar-
gument. In section 7, I offer concluding remarks.
2. Background. The leading contemporary philosophical account of type-
level causal explanation is the “interventionist” or “manipulationist” ac-
count developed by Pearl (2000) and Woodward (2003). Put very briefly,
this account holds that causal relata should be represented as variables in
a structural graph and that one variable in the graph is causally related to
another if and only if at least some interventions on the value of the causal
variable result in a change in the probability distribution over the effect var-
iable. In this context, an ‘intervention’ is a change in the value of the causal
variable that eliminates any other factors that may be relevant to the value
of the causal variable. Events are represented by variables taking particular
values, and one event explains another causally if and only if (i) the ex-
planans event can be represented as a value cj of the variable C, and the
explanandum event can be represented as a value ei of the variable E, such
that some interventions on C change the probability distribution over E; and
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(ii) an intervention that brings about cj raises the probability of ei, that is,
p(eijc^j) > p(ei), where the hat symbol over the value cj indicates that the var-
iable C is set to cj via an intervention.
To illustrate, consider a variable X, which takes the value x1 if a person
smokes and x2 if he does not. Next, we can introduce a variable L, which
takes the value l1 if a person has lung cancer and l2 if he does not. We want
to say that x1 causally explains l1, that is, that smoking causally explains
lung cancer. Interventions that change the value of X also change the prob-
ability distribution over L; if we intervene so that a person becomes a smoker,
then he is more likely to develop lung cancer, and if we intervene so that a
person does not become a smoker, then he is less likely to develop lung can-
cer. So it is true that X causes L, according to the interventionist account.
Thus, condition i for x1 causally explaining l1 is satisfied. Next, we can sup-
pose that p(l1jx^1) > p(l1jx^2), so that p(l1jx^1) > p(l1). Thus, condition ii is sat-
isfied, and smoking causally explains lung cancer.2
This approach to causal explanation is contrastive. The relation of prob-
ability raising under intervention between C 5 cj and E 5 ei does not only
imply that the occurrence of the event represented by C 5 cj explains why
the event represented by E 5 ei occurs. It also implies that the occurrence
of the event represented by C 5 cj explains why the event represented by
E 5 ei occurs rather than the set of events represented by E 5 :ei. This is a
special case of contrastive explanation, one in which the “fact” to be ex-
plained, that is, the event represented by E 5 ei, is contrasted with a “foil”
that is its logical negation.3 This positive instance of contrastive explanation
is underwritten by the fact that interventions bringing about C 5 cj render
E 5 ei more likely to occur than its negation. It is worth noting that there is
a substantial debate over whether contrastive explanations can ever be prob-
abilistic, with Lewis (1986) perhaps the most prominent proponent of the
view that chancy events cannot be explained contrastively and Percival
(2000) arguing that contrastive explanation is impossible when both fact
and foil are chancy events. Though I do not have space here to address this
debate in detail, for the sake of argument I am adopting Hitchcock’s (1996,
1999) position, contra Lewis and Percival, that there is no conflict between
contrastive and probabilistic explanation.4
2. I am leaving to one side any instances of probability-raising noncauses and probability-
lowering causes that may occur in cases of preemption or causal backups (see Fenton-
Glynn 2016).
3. See Lipton (1990) for more detail on the fact-foil distinction and its role in contrastive
explanation.
4. Although Hitchcock is, strictly speaking, concerned with the “explanatory relevance”
of one event to another, where ‘explanatory relevance’ is defined so that event a explains
event e just in case p(eja) ≠ p(a), I take it that his defense of probabilistic contrastive ex-
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Using variables to represent types of phenomena in nature also provides
a framework for stating two crucial necessary conditions for one variable to
be a more fine-grained version of another. Let us stipulate that C0 is a more
fine-grained version of C, or, in other words, that C is a more coarse-grained
version of C0, only if
1. for any cj that is a value of C, there is a c
0
l that is a value of C
0 such that
C0 5 c0l implies C 5 cj;
2. there exists at least one value cj and one value c
0
l such that C 5 cj
does not imply C0 5 c0l.
Moving forward, when I stipulate that causal variables are fine-grained and
coarse-grained versions of each other, this implies that these two key con-
straints relating the variables are satisfied. Additionally, I assume that all
variables form an exhaustive partition over the possible states of the world.
3. Depth, Proportionality, and Abstractness. The same event can be
given a different causal explanation in virtue of changing the granularity
of the causal variable. To see how this works, let Y be a variable that takes
the value y1 if a person smokes Marlboros, y2 if he smokes another brand,
and y3 if he does not smoke. Here, there are at least some interventions on
the value of Y that change the probability distribution over L, that is, those
interventions that change the value of Y from either y1 to y3 or y2 to y3, or
vice versa. It may also be the case that all interventions on Y change the
probability distribution over L if Marlboros are more or less carcinogenic
than other brands, but this is not necessary for a causal relationship; all that
is required is that at least some interventions on the causal variable lead to
changes in the probability distribution over the effect variable. If we make
the further plausible assumption that smoking Marlboros raises the proba-
bility of developing lung cancer relative to the prior probability of lung can-
cer, then we can say that if patients who smoke Marlboros develop lung
cancer, then their smoking Marlboros causally explains their lung cancer.
In a sense, this is exactly the result that we want. It is true that the fact
that patients smoke Marlboros causally explains why they develop lung
cancer. However, there is also a sense in which the explanation is subopti-
mal. Instead of explaining patients’ lung cancer by citing the fact that they
smoked Marlboros, we could say that the patients developed lung cancer
because they smoked. This second, more coarse-grained explanation seems
preferable. After all, the brand of cigarettes that people smoke does not mat-
ter much, if at all, to their chances of getting lung cancer; the relevant detail
planation carries over to an account that conceives of causal explanation as probability-
raising under intervention.
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here is that they smoke. Providing a rationalization for this kind of intuition
is one goal of the literature on the explanatory depth of causal explanations.
As stated in the introduction, a popular idea in the literature on higher-
level causal explanation is that more coarse-grained causal explanations can
be chosen over more fine-grained explanations of the same causal phenom-
enon on the basis that the more coarse-grained explanation is more propor-
tional than the more fine-grained one. This idea appears in Yablo (1992) and
is endorsed to varying degrees by Craver (2007), Woodward (2010), Mala-
terre (2011), Weslake (2013), and Stegmann (2014). Woodward (2010) pro-
vides perhaps the most comprehensive definition of proportionality as a
property of the relationship between cause and effect. For Woodward, pro-
portionality is a property of causal relationships that comes in degrees. A
causal variable stands in a proportional relationship to a given effect vari-
able to the extent that the causal variable is described so that (a) each pos-
sible intervention changing the value of the causal variable determines the
value of the effect variable, and (b) all possible interventions changing the
value of the causal variable correspond to changes in the value of the effect
variable (Woodward 2010, 296).
We can use a classic example from Yablo (1992) to illustrate Wood-
ward’s understanding of proportionality. Suppose that we have trained a pi-
geon to peck at only red targets, to the point that the pigeon will peck at any
red target and refrain from pecking at targets of any other color, as a matter
of certainty. Now suppose that we present the pigeon with a scarlet target,
leading it to peck. We can say that the pigeon pecked at the target either be-
cause the target was scarlet or because the target was red. Clearly, saying
that the pigeon pecked because the target was scarlet fails to fully satisfy
proportionality. Specifically, there is a failure to satisfy condition b. We can
intervene on the target to change it from scarlet to crimson, and the pigeon
will still peck. By contrast, any intervention that changes the color of the
target from red to some other color will make it the case that the pigeon does
not peck. So the explanation ‘the pigeon pecked because the target was red’
perfectly satisfies a and b, whereas ‘the pigeon pecked because the target
was scarlet’ does not.
However, this does not answer the question of why we regard propor-
tional explanations as being deeper than less proportional ones. Weslake
(2010) argues that part of what is at work here is that we tend to regard more
abstract explanations as being deeper than less abstract ones. For Weslake,
when we compare two explanations, the more abstract explanation is one
that we can use in a wider variety of cases, without changing the values of
the variables used. Every Marlboro smoker is also a smoker, so the explana-
tion ‘smoking caused the patient’s lung cancer’will be applicable in all cases
in which the explanation ‘smoking Marlboros caused the patient’s lung can-
cer’ is applicable. However, the reverse obviously does not hold; the expla-
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nation ‘smoking Marlboros caused the patient’s lung cancer’ does not apply
in all the cases in which ‘smoking caused the patient’s lung cancer’ does.
Weslake (2013) argues further that there is a clear connection between
the abstractness of a causal explanation and its proportionality. If we con-
sider the pigeon example, it is clear that the explanation ‘the pigeon pecked
because the target was scarlet’ is applicable to fewer cases than ‘the pigeon
pecked because the target was red’ and that in any case in which the former
applies, the latter also applies. Indeed, in deterministic cases a perfectly pro-
portional causal explanation of a given explanandum will generally be more
abstract than a less proportional explanation of the same explanandum. If all
red targets cause the pigeon to peck and all nonred targets cause the pigeon
not to peck, it follows that any red target that has some other property A will
also cause the pigeon to peck, and any nonred target that has some other
property B will cause the pigeon not to peck. Thus, a more proportional ex-
planation is applicable wherever a less proportional one is also applicable.
However, it follows from the truth of the more proportional explanation that
the pigeon will also peck when presented with a red target that does not
have property A and not peck when presented with a nonred target that does
not have property B. The explanation ‘the pigeon pecked because it was
presented with a red target with property A’ will not apply in these cases,
but the more proportional explanation ‘the pigeon pecked because the target
was red’will. Thus, proportionality tracks abstractness in deterministic cases.
Moving further, there is also a strong intuitive connection between ab-
straction and explanatory depth. I take it that the force of this intuition lies
in the thought, most famously expressed by Kitcher (1981), that explana-
tion in general involves the subsumption of specific events under more gen-
eral patterns, in this case patterns of causation. If such subsumption is part
of the purpose of explanation, then it makes sense that we would prefer to
give explanations that are able to subsume more events under a given type-
level causal pattern. This preference for abstraction is linked closely to what
Ylikoski and Kuorikoski (2010) call the “cognitive salience” of a given ex-
planation. They write that “the kinds of inferences possible for limited cog-
nitive systems such as humans directly affect what can be explained and
understood by such cognitive systems” (214). Since more abstract explana-
tions tend to use more coarse-grained variables, they allow us to use “the
same words [to refer] to similarly structured forms of causal interaction in
different fields,” thereby reducing the cognitive burden associated with causal
explanation in many cases (214).
Weslake argues that an emphasis on abstraction as a good-making fea-
ture of an explanation stands in contrast with Hitchcock and Woodward’s
(2003) claim that causal explanations are deeper when and because they
are situated within an explanatory model that is more “invariant,” where an
invariant model is one that answers more what-if-things-had-been-different
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questions about the target system. To use Weslake’s example, the ideal gas
law can be used to explain the change in the pressure of a gas with a fixed
temperature and changing volume. That is, we can use the ideal gas law to
answer questions about what would happen under various changes in the
volume of the gas’s container. However, a model containing a variable rep-
resenting the microphysical state of the gas, rather than its volume, answers
just as many counterfactual questions as the more abstract, coarse-grained
model. For Weslake, this shows the limitations of invariance as a dimension
of explanatory depth; highly fine-grained explanations seem to have invari-
ance greater than or equal to that of coarse-grained explanations in cases in
which a coarse-grained explanation seemsmore appropriate. I concurwithWes-
lake’s argument here, although seeWoodward (forthcoming) for a response.
4. The Probabilistic Context. In probabilistic contexts, the picture pre-
sented above becomes considerably more complicated. So we will need to
translate the concepts of proportionality and abstractness to accommodate
probabilistic relationships between variables. In what follows, I will put for-
ward what I take to be reasonable probabilistic extensions of the concepts of
proportionality and abstractness. I will show that there are some cases in
which a less proportional causal explanation seems to be deeper than a more
proportional one. Similarly, I will show that in other cases, a less abstract ex-
planation seems to be deeper than a more abstract competitor. Thus, I con-
clude that the tight relationship between proportionality, abstractness, and
explanatory depth comes apart in probabilistic contexts.
Let us begin by defining a probabilistic measure of proportionality. Clearly,
the understanding of proportionality articulated above is not suited to prob-
abilistic relationships, since it measures the proportionality of a causal rela-
tionship according to the extent to which the various states of the cause de-
termine the state of the effect. So we will need a new measure for assessing
the comparative proportionality of causal relationships where the relation-
ship between cause and effect is probabilistic. One attempt at this task is put
forward by Pocheville et al. (2017), who understand proportionality as fol-
lows. If refining the causal variable makes no difference to the conditional
probability distribution over some effect variable, then the relationship be-
tween the coarse-grained causal variable and the effect variable is more pro-
portional than the relationship between the fine-grained causal variable and
the effect variable. However, if refining the causal variable makes any dif-
ference at all to the conditional probability distribution over the effect var-
iable, then the relationship between the fine-grained causal variable and the
effect variable is more proportional than the relationship between the coarse-
grained causal variable and the effect variable.
To see why this translation of proportionality into the probabilistic con-
text is warranted, note that, in general, the concept of proportionality aims
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to capture the salient difference-making relationship between cause and ef-
fect (see List and Menzies 2009). In the pigeon case, when we say that the
pigeon pecked at the target because it was scarlet, we fail to identify what is
really making the difference with respect to whether the pigeon pecks. It is
the target’s redness, rather than its being any shade of red, that makes the
difference. A perfectly proportional causal explanation is one that conveys
all and only the difference makers with respect to some effect. In probabi-
listic cases, it seems that we have no choice but to interpret this difference-
making constraint probabilistically and say that the proportional explana-
tion is the one that identifies every factor that makes a difference to the
probability distribution over the effect, and only those factors.5
We can show that Pocheville et al.’s criterion gets the right results in
some intuitive cases. Consider the following case. Suppose that the proba-
bility of smokers developing lung cancer is .1, and the probability of non-
smokers developing lung cancer is .01. Suppose that the brand of cigarette
smoked does not make a difference to patients’ likelihood of lung cancer;
both Marlboro smokers and non–Marlboro smokers have a .1 probability of
developing lung cancer. Pocheville et al.’s approach renders the verdict that
‘smoking caused the patient’s lung cancer’ is a more proportional explana-
tion than ‘smoking Marlboros caused the patient’s lung cancer’. This fits
with common sense as well; in cases in which the brand of cigarette smoked
makes no difference to a person’s probability of developing lung cancer, the
more proportional, more abstract, and deeper explanation is one that es-
chews any mention of cigarette branding.
So far, so good. However, once we let go of the constraint that refining
the causal variable makes no difference to the probability of the effect, pro-
portionality seems to come apart from explanatory depth. Suppose that smok-
ing Marlboros results in a .1001 probability of lung cancer, and smoking other
brands results in a .0999 probability of lung cancer. As before, smoking in
general results in a .1 probability of lung cancer, and nonsmoking results in
a .01 probability of lung cancer. It follows from Pocheville et al.’s approach
that the explanation ‘smoking Marlboros caused the patient’s lung cancer’
is more proportional than the explanation ‘smoking caused the patient’s lung
cancer’. However, I take it that the latter explanation is deeper than the for-
5. In Pocheville et al.’s paper, they aim to define proportionality and other aspects of
causal relationships using information theory, as formulated by Shannon and Weaver
(1949). On their view, if the mutual information between an intervention on a causal var-
iable and its effect is greater than that between another cause-effect pair, then the first
relationship is more proportional. If two relationships have equal mutual information,
the more proportional relationship is that with minimal entropy. This criterion ensures
that any refinement of the causal variable that makes any difference to the conditional
probability distribution over the effect variable will yield a more proportional causal re-
lationship.
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mer. Certainly, in the actual practice of science it would seem overly specific
to cite the brand of cigarettes that a person smokes when explaining why he
developed lung cancer, simply because the person chose a very slightly more
carcinogenic brand. What seems to matter here for explanatory purposes is
that there is an important causal trend—smoking causes lung cancer—that
a given case can be subsumed under. Thus, proportionality and explanatory
depth come apart in this case.
Next, we can extend the notion of abstractness into the probabilistic set-
ting. Recall that causal explanation is defined above as probability-raising
under intervention; C 5 cj explains E 5 ei if and only if an intervention
setting the value of C to cj raises the probability that E 5 ei. Next, recall
that the most abstract explanation of a given explanandum event is one that
subsumes the widest class of specific events under a given causal relation.
Thus, ‘the patient’s smoking caused his lung cancer’ is a more abstract ex-
planation than ‘the patient’s smoking Marlboros caused his lung cancer’.
More generally, we can say that the most abstract explanation of a given
explanandum is one that subsumes under one broad category all the ways
in which the probability of the explanandum event could be raised via in-
tervention. Typically, we think that abstractness in explanation tends to go
hand-in-hand with explanatory depth; explanations that are not optimally ab-
stract are usually overly detailed and therefore suboptimal.
However, there are cases that put pressure on the notion that explana-
tions are deeper when and because they are more abstract. Consider a case
in which a person suffering from some bacterial disease receives an antibi-
otic containing penicillin and recovers. Suppose that, in general, antibiotics
containing penicillin have a .95 probability of curing patients with this dis-
ease. However, suppose that doctors could also prescribe the patient an an-
tibiotic that does not contain penicillin and that in these circumstances the
patient would have recovered with probability .7. Without any antibiotics,
the recovery rate is only .1. For some assignments of prior probabilities
to each causal event, administering either antibiotic raises the patient’s prob-
ability of recovery. Thus, a more abstract rival to the explanation ‘an anti-
biotic containing penicillin caused the patient to recover’ would be the ex-
planation ‘an antibiotic caused the patient to recover’. However, it is not
clear to me that in this case, the more abstract explanation is the better or
deeper one. It seems to matter here that the patient’s recovery was aided
by penicillin, and leaving this fact out seems to miss something important
about the patient’s recovery. To use Franklin-Hall’s phrase, the more ab-
stract explanation “overshoots” the optimal level of explanatory granularity
(2016, 570). Thus, in some probabilistic cases, abstraction does not track
explanatory depth.
In light of these arguments, we will need to look for another way of de-
termining the optimal level of granularity for explanation in probabilistic
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cases. In the next section, I will introduce my strategy for measuring the
pragmatic value of a causal model. I will then argue that by considering
the pragmatic value of a causal model, we can arrive at a compelling justi-
fication of our intuitions regarding explanatory depth in the cases described
above.
5. The Pragmatic Value of a Causal Model. It is clear from the argu-
ments in the previous section that in probabilistic contexts, an explanation
can be maximally proportional but overly detailed, because the differences
that various refinements of the causal variable make to the probability distri-
bution over the effect variable are too small. On the other hand, an explana-
tion can be too abstract; sometimes details that make a difference to the prob-
ability distribution add explanatory depth, even if we can pick out the class
of probability-raising factors for some explanandum without using these de-
tails. Weatherson (2012) calls this difficulty in finding the best level of detail
for a given explanation the “Goldilocks Problem”: we need a level of gran-
ularity for our causal explanations that is not too detailed, not too abstract,
but just right.
Franklin-Hall writes that “making sense of the explanatory—not merely
the practical—superiority of high-level explanations in a physical world has
been a kind of Holy Grail in the philosophy of science, long sought but never
found” (2016, 555). My own thought is that a distinctly nonpragmatic di-
mension to explanatory depth may not exist. Indeed, when we rationalize
the intuition that a given detail ought to be included or not included in the
deepest explanation of some event, it seems that we invariably revert to prag-
matic language. If asked why we do not usually include the brand of cigarette
smoked in an explanation of why a patient developed lung cancer, even when
a patient smokes a slightly more carcinogenic cigarette, there is a strong urge
to say that the slight difference in brands just does not matter enough to be
worth documenting in an explanation. By contrast, in the antibiotics case it
does seem to matter that penicillin was administered to the patient. This em-
phasis on the degree to which a given detail matters already shifts us into a
consideration of the pragmatic value of an explanation. So it makes sense
that we would appeal to pragmatics in assessing the overall superiority of
a higher-level causal explanation as compared to a lower-level alternative.
There is a useful analogy here to the epistemic standard required for con-
viction in a criminal trial. Juries are asked to determine whether the de-
fendant is guilty ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’. Of course, the nature of this
standard is vague. If by ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ we mean absolute cer-
tainty, then few, if any, defendants will ever be found guilty. So it must be
that a juror’s credence in the defendant’s guilt must rise above some thresh-
old probability. This generates the problem of where to set the threshold. It
is at this point that pragmatics will begin to play a role. If the defendant is
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facing life in prison, then the threshold will have to be set very high, to ac-
count for the negative consequences of making a mistake. If the possible
sentence is much less serious, then the jury’s standard will likely drop as
well. I take it that a similar dynamic is at play in the pragmatic evaluation
of explanatory models. There is some threshold for the degree of probabi-
listic difference making between possible values of a causal variable such
that those values should be included in our model. However, setting the
threshold at ‘any difference at all’ is unrealistic and unintuitive; it would
yield hopelessly complicated explanatory models. What we need to do is
consider the pragmatic consequences of including or not including the de-
tail in an explanatory model and set our threshold for explanatorily relevant
difference making accordingly.
Thus, I will seek to develop a distinctly pragmatic criterion for determin-
ing the best level of description for a given probabilistic explanation. My
approach can be summarized as follows. When scientists or ordinary per-
sons explain a phenomenon causally, there is a sense in which they make
a decision. They take a particular cause of some effect and choose to embed
it with a given causal model, as one value of a causal variable that may be
defined at many different levels of granularity. I argue that in making this
decision, the agents should choose the most coarse-grained causal variable
that does not elide any information that is of value to them. To justify this
preference for coarse-grained causal explanations, recall both Weslake (2010)
and Ylikoski and Kuorikoski’s (2010) insistence that it is a virtue of some
explanatory models that we can use the same names to refer to similar causal
factors, thereby providing a unified understanding of why some phenomenon
occurred. My criterion takes this insistence on coarse-graining seriously, ar-
guing that if there is no pragmatic cost to agents from coarsening their de-
scription of a causal factor, then those agents should coarse-grain.
My proposal measures the value of information using the decision-
theoretic concept of the fair price of causal information (FPCI), which has
its roots in Blackwell (1951), Savage (1954), and Good (1967) and is also
discussed in Resnik (1987). To illustrate the concept, consider the following
example. Suppose that an analyst has to decide whether to approve or deny
an individual for life insurance. In an obvious oversimplification, suppose
that only one fact—whether or not the potential customer develops lung can-
cer—will determine whether offering the policy will lead to a positive or
negative outcome for the insurance company. How much should the analyst
pay to learn whether or not the potential customer smokes?
Let us begin by explicating the decision problem that the analyst faces.
She has to choose either of two actions: approve or deny. The utility that she
gets from performing each of these actions depends on whether or not the
potential customer will develop lung cancer. Table 1 specifies the utilities
of each action in each relevant state of the world. The analyst cannot learn
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whether the customer will develop lung cancer but can learn whether or not
the customer smokes. Suppose further that if a person smokes, then there is
a .1 probability that he will develop lung cancer. If he does not smoke, then
there is a .01 probability that he will develop lung cancer. Assume that these
probabilities are each “causal” probabilities, in the sense that the value of
the causal variable is set via an intervention. Now suppose that the analyst
learns that the potential customer does in fact smoke. Under these condi-
tions, the expected utility of approve is :1(2100) 1 :9(10) 5 21 and the
expected utility of deny is 0. So the analyst would choose to deny and ex-
pect a utility of 0. Next, suppose that the analyst learns that the person does
not smoke. Under this supposition, the expected utility of approve would be
:01(2100) 1 :99(10) 5 8:9, and the expected utility of deny would be 0.
So the analyst would choose to approve and expect a utility of 8.9. Finally,
let us suppose that the analyst has the prior belief that a person is equally
likely to smoke or not smoke. Under this supposition, the expected utility
from learning the potential customer’s smoker status is :5(0) 1 :5(8:9) 5
4:45.
However, to calculate the fair price of information about whether or not
the potential customer smokes, one also has to consider what the analyst
would have done had she not learned the potential customer’s smoker sta-
tus. Her prior beliefs about whether the potential customer smokes and her
posterior beliefs about whether the potential customer develops lung cancer
(given the customer’s smoker status) jointly imply that the potential cus-
tomer has a prior probability .055 of developing lung cancer and therefore
a prior probability .945 of not developing lung cancer. Thus, if the analyst
does not learn whether the customer smokes, then the expected utility of ap-
prove is :055(2100) 1 :945(10) 5 3:95 and the expected utility of deny is 0.
Since the analyst always acts to maximize expected utility, in the absence of
information as to the potential customer’s smoker status, she would choose
approve. If we subtract the expected utility of approve when smoker status
is unknown from the expected utility of learning whether the potential cus-
tomer smokes, we get 4:45 2 3:95 5 :5. This is the fair price of informa-
tion regarding whether or not the potential customer smokes; the analyst
should pay only up to half a unit of whatever currency the utilities are ex-
pressed in to learn whether or not the potential customer smokes.6
6. See the appendix for an abstract model of the FPCI.
TABLE 1. UTILITY MATRIX FOR LIFE
INSURANCE DECISION
Lung Cancer No Lung Cancer
Approve 2100 10
Deny 0 0
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In some cases, refining the causal variable adds no pragmatic value to a
causal model. Consider the case from the previous section, in which smok-
ers have a probability .1 of developing lung cancer regardless of the brand
that they smoke, and nonsmokers have a .01 chance of developing lung can-
cer. The utility matrix for the decision to approve or deny a customer for life
insurance is the same as in table 1. If we suppose that the brand smoked by
the potential customer makes no difference to his probability of developing
lung cancer, then we know that learning this information will not change the
action with maximum expected utility, as compared to when the customer
smokes. Thus, the FPCI with respect to whether the customer smokes Marl-
boros or another brand or does not smoke will be the same as the FPCI with
respect to whether or not the customer smokes. As there is no loss of prag-
matic value at the more coarse-grained level of description, choosing the
fine-grained variable over the coarse-grained variable introduces a level
of complexity to the model that is worthless, from a pragmatic perspective,
and therefore the refinement ought to be avoided.
We do not need to worry here about the prior probability distribution over
either causal variable. If it is the case that agents would pay more to learn the
value of the fine-grained variable than they would to learn the value of its
coarse-grained counterpart, then the prior probability distribution over causal
variables determines to some degree how much more agents should pay for
information about the value of a more fine-grained variable as compared to
its coarse-grained counterpart. However, changes in the prior distribution
over the causal variable will never undo this inequality. Similarly, if infor-
mation about the value of a fine-grained variable is worth no more to agents
than information about the value of a coarse-grained version of the same
variable, this equality will be invariant across changes to the probability dis-
tribution over either variable.
In general, we want it to be the case that if refining the causal variable
makes no difference to the probability distribution over the effect variable,
then the coarse-grained explanation is to be preferred to the fine-grained ex-
planation on pragmatic as well as explanatory grounds. This should hold re-
gardless of the agents’ pragmatic interests. The FPCI measure defined here
satisfies this desideratum. Let p(C^,U, E) denote the FPCI for a causal var-
iable C, given a utility matrix U and effect variable E. The following prop-
osition is true (see the appendix for a proof ):
Proposition 1. For any causal variables C and C0, effect variable E, utility
matrix U, and probability distribution p(), where C0 and C are both causes
of E and C0 is a fine-grained version of C, if p(eijc^0l) 5 p(eijc^j) for all sets
of values ei, cj, and c
0
l such that C
0
5 c0l implies C 5 cj, then
p(C^,U, E) 5 p(C^0,U, E).
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This means that in the class of “easy cases” in which refining the causal var-
iable makes no difference to the probability distribution over the effect, it is
also the case that the coarse-grained explanation provides equal pragmatic
value with less complexity and can therefore be chosen over a fine-grained
alternative. Of course, these are the same easy cases in which a more pro-
portional explanation is also more abstract and also intuitively deeper. What
we need to do now is consider those cases in which a more proportional or
more abstract explanation seems less deep than a less proportional or less
abstract rival and determine whether an FPCI-based measure of the prag-
matic value of an explanation is of any help.
First, we can consider the case in which proportionality and depth come
apart. Here, the probability of developing lung cancer from smoking Marl-
boros was .1001, and the probability of developing lung cancer from smok-
ing other brands was .0999. If we again use the utility matrix in table 1, one
can check that learning whether the potential customer smokes Marlboros,
smokes another brand, or does not smoke will not make any difference to
the analyst’s decision, as compared to simply learning whether or not the
customer smokes. Thus, she will pay no more to learn the value of this more
fine-grained variable than she would to learn the value of its coarse-grained
counterpart. By considering the pragmatic value of causal information in as-
sessing explanatory depth, we can conclude that the coarse-grained expla-
nation ‘the patient developed lung cancer because he smoked’ is deeper than
the fine-grained explanation ‘the patient developed lung cancer because he
smoked Marlboros’, even in cases in which Marlboros are slightly more car-
cinogenic than other cigarettes.
Next, consider the case of treating a patient with antibiotics that may or
may not contain penicillin. Recall that in this case, a less abstract explana-
tion seems to be deeper. Again, we can consider the decision faced by a life
insurance analyst, where the analyst’s utilities in the state of the world where
the patient does or does not recover from the bacterial infection are given in
table 2. The relevant expected utilities for the analyst are as follows:
EU ApprovejPenicillinð Þ 5 :05 2100ð Þ 1 :95 10ð Þ 5 4:5, (1)
EU ApprovejNon-Penicillin Antibioticð Þ 5 :3 2100ð Þ 1 :7 10ð Þ 5 223, (2)
EU ApprovejNo Drugsð Þ 5 :8 2100ð Þ 1 :2 10ð Þ 5 278: (3)
Once again the expected utility of deny is always 0. Let us assume that a per-
son has a prior probability .4 of receiving antibiotics with penicillin, a prior
probability .4 of receiving antibiotics without penicillin, and a prior probabil-
ity .2 of receiving no treatment. This entails that the prior probability of no
recovery is .32 and the prior probability of recovery is .68, so that the expected
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utility of approve in the absence of information about the patient’s treatment
is :32(2100) 1 :68(10) 5 225:2. Thus, the FPCI regarding the patient’s
treatment is ½:4(4:5) 1 :4(0) 1 :2(0) 2 0 5 1:8.
If we coarse-grain the causal variable and consider only whether or not
the patient receives antibiotics, the model loses pragmatic value. One can
check that if the analyst knew that the patient had received antibiotics, but
not whether those antibiotics contained penicillin, then the analyst would
choose deny. Since the analyst would also choose deny if she learned that
the patient did not receive antibiotics and would choose deny in the absence
of information, there is no value to learning whether or not the patient re-
ceived antibiotics; the FPCI is zero. Thus, the coarse-grained explanatory
model of the patient’s recovery, that is, the model that makes no mention of
penicillin, is less pragmatically valuable than the fine-grained model that does
mention penicillin. This goes some way toward providing a rationalization of
why greater abstraction does not seem to result in greater explanatory depth in
this case; the more abstract explanation conceals information that rises above
some threshold of pragmatic usefulness. Thus, my pragmatic approach to ex-
planatory depth proves useful in this case as well.
I do not claim that FPCI constitutes a totalizing measure of explanatory
depth; I find it unlikely that such a measure could exist. However, I believe
that FPCI addresses an important issue in the literature on explanatory depth.
Weslake (2010), Woodward (2010), and Ylikoski and Kuorikoski (2010) all
accept that the depth of a causal explanation at a particular level of granular-
ity, as compared to explanations of the same phenomenon at finer or coarser
grains, is sensitive to our interests as agents. However, this is often described
in a very general way, without much mathematical precision. My proposal
makes the interest-relative dimension of explanatory depth precise by math-
ematically linking it to the utilities that an agent assigns to various outcomes
in a given decision problem. More precisely, my proposal quantifies the ex-
tent to which an explanatory causal model enables an agent to make the best
decision possible, as defined by the agent’s own utility function over out-
comes, while minimizing cognitive burdens due to the complexity with which
the explanans is described. This stands in contrast to purely epistemic mea-
sures of explanatory depth, which consider only the probability distribution
over the possible values of an explanandum, given the possible values of
the explanans.
TABLE 2. UTILITY MATRIX FOR LIFE
INSURANCE DECISION
No Recovery Recovery
Approve 2100 10
Deny 0 0
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6. Potential Objections. There are several potential objections to the view
presented above. First, one could worry that it is strange to consider the value
of information in cases in which we already possess the information in ques-
tion. In the smoking case, we may already know that the patient is a Marl-
boro smoker, and in the antibiotics case, we may already know that the pa-
tient has been prescribed antibiotics containing penicillin. So why does it
matter what insurance analysts would pay to learn this information in a coun-
terfactual scenario in which they did not already know it?
One way of replying to this worry is to say that our choice of granularity
for an explanatory model guides future searches for explanatory informa-
tion. For example, when we say of a given patient that smoking caused
his lung cancer, this implies that when we search for an explanation of some
other patient’s lung cancer, we can begin by asking “did he smoke?” Clearly,
the answer to this question will be valuable to us as both explanatory and prag-
matic agents. Now suppose instead that we ask “did he smoke Marlboros?”
If the answer is “no,” then we will need to ask another question, namely,
“did he smoke any other brands?” Regardless of the answer to this question,
it is clear that it would have been better just to ask, in the first place, “did he
smoke?” By contrast, in the antibiotics case, it seems that the answer to the
question “was the patient given penicillin?” will be explanatorily useful to
us in understanding why the patient recovered, regardless of whether the
answer is “yes” or “no.” In this case, the introduction of a finer granularity
of causal information seems to provide a meaningful direction of inquiry in
future cases, rather than merely introducing unnecessary complexity to sci-
entific practice.
Next, one could worry that in the examples that I have given above, the
interventionist theory of causation is actually doing very little work. For the
life insurance analyst in question, information about the causes of lung can-
cer will not necessarily be any more valuable than information about non-
causal correlates of lung cancer. To illustrate, it might be the case that in-
formation about how yellow a customer’s fingers and teeth are may be as
valuable to our insurance analyst as information about the customer’s smoker
status, even though yellow teeth and fingers are not causes of lung cancer.
Further, depending on the structure of the broader causal model in which a
given cause-effect relation is embedded, data about noncausal correlates may
be more useful to an agent than data about the causes of some variable of in-
terest. Finally, given that the interventions used in philosophical analyses of
causation are usually understood as counterfactual, a real-life insurance ana-
lyst never could learn that such an intervention had been performed. So it is
worth asking whether it makes sense to use an information-pricing model to
measure the pragmatic value of a causal explanation.
In response, I concede that the example of an insurance analyst deciding
how much to pay for information about a potential customer is not a per-
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fect analogy, for exactly the reasons given above. However, the analogy still
does serve its purpose. My project in this article is to provide a strategy for
determining the deepest level of causal explanation in a given case. After
determining that competing causal explanations at varying levels of gran-
ularity are all causal explanations of the same phenomenon, I then use an
information-pricing analysis to settle the question of the optimal depth. This
second step is not, in itself, uniquely suited to causal as opposed to noncausal
models. However, my analysis takes for granted that we are already talking
about causal explanations. For example, on my account we would first use an
interventionist criterion of causation to determine that smoking, and not yel-
low teeth and fingers, is a cause of lung cancer. Then, we would use an FPCI-
based criterion to determine the optimal level of granularity for describing a
person’s smoker status when explaining why he has lung cancer. Variables
denoting the color of a person’s teeth or fingers do not make it to this second
stage of analysis, since they are not causes of lung cancer in the first place.7
Finally, there is some force to the antipragmatic notion that the better ex-
planation of some phenomenon should never depend on the context-specific
utilities of the agent doing the explaining. To put it bluntly, it seems strange
to think that life insurance premiums should influence what counts as the best
explanation of a patient’s lung cancer. However, attempts up to this point to
give some purely nonpragmatic account of the value of explanations have
proven unsuccessful. As Franklin-Hall (2016) points out, the space of possi-
ble variables that we can use to represent a given causal explanans is enor-
mous, presenting reasons for pessimism that a single epistemic criterion could
rule out all but the best variables for a given explanation in the intervention-
ist framework. The abstraction criterion proposed byWeslake (2010) solves
some problems but runs into others. These problems arise in cases involving
disjunctive variables—as Weatherson (2012) and Clarke (2017) have pointed
out—and in probabilistic cases, as I have pointed out here. The same goes
for proportionality, in part for reasons described above and in part for rea-
sons described by Shapiro and Sober (2012) that I have not had space to
address. Finally, Franklin-Hall (2016) argues that analyzing explanatory depth
in terms of the stability of an explanation, that is, its robustness in the face of
changes to background conditions, also allows for putatively deep explana-
tions that use disjunctive variables. The use of such variables seems out of
keeping with scientific practice, and thus stability also fails as an epistemic cri-
terion for explanatory depth.
7. Having said this, an interesting avenue for future research would be an exploration of
the overlap between information-pricing analyses of explanatory models and existing
work on the expected utility of interventions and observations in inferring causal graphs
(see Eberhardt 2007, 170).
162 DAVID KINNEY
This content downloaded from 158.143.037.154 on September 12, 2019 09:12:10 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
In light of this failure to find an epistemic criterion for explanatory depth,
I believe that we ought to take seriously the idea that the notion of superi-
ority that we attach to some explanations is fundamentally an artifact of our
perspective as pragmatically motivated agents, rather than some observer-
independent feature of nature. As such, the intrusion of pragmatics into judg-
ments of explanatory depth may be inevitable, especially in threshold cases
in which different explanatory desiderata such as proportionality and ab-
stractness pull in different directions. My proposal provides a precise way
to take into account an agent’s prudential interests in order to give an ac-
count of how these interests determine an optimal granularity for causal ex-
planations.
There is some precedent for this kind of approach in the literature. An-
dersen (2017) follows Dennett (1991) in arguing that causal relata are high-
level “patterns” formed of lower-level “pixels,” where patterns are realized
by pixels but are robust over a certain amount of noise in their pixel-level
realizations. For example, a bar code composed of individual pixels may
cause a scanner to receive a certain message when the bar code is scanned.
This causal relationship between the bar code and the scanner may be ro-
bust over many possible changes in the individual pixels making up the
bar code. The degree of noise that we will tolerate while still picking out the
bar code as an important causal relatum is set via pragmatic concerns; as
long as the bar code does its job, we can speak coherently of the bar code
playing an explanatory causal role with respect to the transfer of information
and not worry about the particular arrangement of pixels. That this account
of higher-level causation is sensitive to pragmatic concerns is explicated by
Andersen when she writes that “the more efficiently we describe a pattern,
the faster we can identify whether it occurs. If there are tasks for which speed
is relevant, we might prioritize efficiency of description and accept reduced
accuracy” (2017, 603). My proposal here makes a similar point: our prag-
matic concerns clearly play some role in the kinds of events that we pick
out as explanatorily salient and the level of granularity with which we pick
them out.
7. Conclusion. This work has considered the way in which proportionality
and abstractness provide an account of explanatory depth in deterministic
cases. I then show how this account unravels in the probabilistic context. I
propose a novel measure of the pragmatic value of an explanatory frame-
work and show how it addresses the problematic cases considered. I argue
that this measure enables us to account for the intuition that some explana-
tions are better than others in probabilistic contexts, albeit via the essential
consideration of the pragmatic context of an explanation.
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Appendix
General Definition of FPCI. Begin with a set of acts A 5 fa1, a2, ::: , arg, a
set of effect states E 5 fe1, e2, ::: , eng, and a set of cause states C 5
fc1, c2, ::: , cmg. Let u() be a utility function that takes as its arguments an
action ak and a value of the effect variable ei. Let p() be a joint probability
function over the values of E and C. We can define the joint probability ma-
trix PE,C, utility matrix U, and effect vector PE
!
as follows:
PE,C 5
p e1jc^1ð Þp c^1ð Þ p e1jc^2ð Þp c^2ð Þ ::: p e1jc^mð Þp c^mð Þ
p e2jc^1ð Þp c^1ð Þ p e2jc^2ð Þp c^2ð Þ ::: p e2jc^mð Þp c^mð Þ
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮
p enjc^1ð Þp c^1ð Þ p enjc^2ð Þp c^2ð Þ ::: p enjc^mð Þp c^mð Þ
2
6666664
3
7777775
, (A1)
U 5
u a1, e1ð Þ u a1, e2ð Þ ::: u a1, enð Þ
u a2, e1ð Þ u a2, e2ð Þ ::: u a2, enð Þ
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮
u ar, e1ð Þ u ar, e2ð Þ ::: u ar, enð Þ
2
6666664
3
7777775
, (A2)
PE
!
5
p e1ð Þ
p e2ð Þ
⋮
p enð Þ
2
6666664
3
7777775
: (A3)
Let max() be a function that takes a matrix as its argument and returns a vec-
tor containing the maximum value in each column of that matrix, with ver-
tical vectors treated as one-column matrices. Let sum() be a function that
takes a vector as its argument and returns the sum of each element in the vec-
tor. We can define the fair price of causal information for a causal variable C,
utility matrix U, and effect variable E as follows:
p(C^,U, E) 5 sum max U  PE,Cð Þð Þ 2 max U  PE
! 
: (A4)
Proof of Proposition 1. Begin by writing the formula for the FPCI of causal
variables C and C0:
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p(C^,U, E) 5 sum max U  PE,Cð Þð Þ 2 max U  PE
! 
, (A5)
p(C^0,U, E) 5 sum max U  PE,C0ð Þð Þ 2 max U  PE
! 
: (A6)
Next, we can show that in this case,
sum max U  PE,C0ð Þð Þ 5 sum max U  PE,Cð Þð Þ:
To do so, we begin by expanding the matrices U  PE,C and U  PE,C0 :
U  PE,C 5
p(c^1)o
n
i51
p(eijc^1)u(a1, ei) ::: p(c^m)o
n
i51
p(eijc^m)u(a1, ei)
⋮ ⋮ ⋮
p(c^1)o
n
i51
p(eijc^1)u(ar, ei) ::: p(c^m)o
n
i51
p(eijc^m)u(ar, ei)
2
6666664
3
7777775
, (A7)
U  PE,C0 5
p(c^01)o
n
i51
p(eijc^
0
1)u(a1, ei) ::: p(c^
0
q)o
n
i51
p(eijc^
0
q)u(a1, ei)
⋮ ⋮ ⋮
p(c^01)o
n
i51
p(eijc^
0
1)u(ar, ei) ::: p(c^
0
q)o
n
i51
p(eijc^
0
q)u(ar, ei)
2
6666664
3
7777775
: (A8)
Next, consider any value cj such that C 5 cj if and only if C
0 takes a value in
some set {c0l, c
0
l11, ... , c
0
l1z}. We can define submatrices U  PE,C½ j and
U  PE,C0 ½l : l 1 z as follows:
U  PE,C½j 5
p(c^j)o
n
i51
p(eijc^j)u(a1, ei)
⋮
p(c^j)o
n
i51
p(eijc^j)u(ar, ei)
2
6666664
3
7777775
, (A9)
U  PE,C0 ½l : l 1 z
5
p(c^0l)o
n
i51
p(eijc^
0
l)u(a1, ei) ::: p(c^
0
l1z)o
n
i51
p(eijc^
0
l1z)u(a1, ei)
⋮ ⋮ ⋮
p(c^0l)o
n
i51
p(eijc^
0
l)u(ar, ei) ::: p(c^
0
l1z)o
n
i51
p(eijc^
0
l1z)u(ar, ei)
2
6666664
3
7777775
:
(A10)
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The sum of every element in a given row of U  PE,C0 ½l : l 1 z equals the el-
ement in the corresponding row of U  PE,C½ j. If p(eijc^0l) 5 p(eijc^j) for all
sets of values ei, cj, and c
0
l such that C
0
5 c0l implies C 5 cj, then
o
n
i51
p(eijc^
0
l1v)u(ak , ei) 5 o
n
i51
p(eijc^j)u(ak , ei)
for any ak. This implies that the submatrixU  PE,C0 ½l : l 1 z is row-dominated.
It follows from this that
sum max U  PE,C0 ½l : l 1 zð Þð Þ 5 sum max U  PE,C½ jð Þð Þ
for any cj and any set {c
0
l, c
0
l11, ... , c
0
l1z} such that {c
0
l, c
0
l11, ... , c
0
l1z} is the union
of all values of C0 that imply that C 5 cj. It follows from this that
sum max U  PE,C0ð Þð Þ 5 sum max U  PE,Cð Þð Þ:
Since max(U  PE
!
) is unchanged by refining the causal variable, this implies
that p(C^,U, E) 5 p(C^0,U, E). QED
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